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Abstract—1With the proliferation of the Internet of Thi-
ngs (IoT), the need to prioritize the overall system security is
more imperative than ever. The IoT will profoundly change the
established usage patterns of embedded systems, where devices
traditionally operate in relative isolation. Internet connectivity
brought by the IoT exposes such previously isolated internal
device structures to cyber-attacks through the Internet, which
opens new attack vectors and vulnerabilities. For example, a
malicious user can modify the firmware or operating system by
using a remote connection, aiming to deactivate standard defenses
against malware. The criticality of applications, for example, in
the Industrial IoT (IIoT) further underlines the need to ensure
the integrity of the embedded software.
One common approach to ensure system integrity is to verify
the operating system and application software during the boot
process. However, safety-critical IoT devices have constrained
boot-up times, and home IoT devices should become available
quickly after being turned on. Therefore, the boot-time can
affect the usability of a device. This paper analyses performance
trade-offs of secure boot for medium-scale embedded systems,
such as Beaglebone and Raspberry Pi. We evaluate two secure
boot techniques, one is only software-based, and the second is
supported by a hardware-based cryptographic storage unit. For
the software-based method, we show that secure boot merely
increases the overall boot time by 4%. Moreover, the additional
cryptographic hardware storage increases the boot-up time by
36%.
Index Terms—Embedded Systems, Internet of Things, Secure
Boot, System Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) will bring connectivity to ev-
eryday objects and devices, including vehicles [1], autonomous
robots [2], and smart home appliances [3] (e.g., smart vacuum
cleaners, smart cookers, smart heaters). While Internet con-
nectivity allows numerous new applications and use-cases, it
exposes devices to the security threats of the Internet: if we
connect a device to the Internet, it will certainly be attacked
and potentially penetrated, i.e., intruders can read data or
even modify executable system files. Such modifications are
especially critical in the context of the IoT, as the devices
often control physical objects such as the cooling system of a
refrigerator or the engine of a car.
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Today, we commonly find a secure boot process in regular
computer systems, including personal computers [4], data
centers [5] and also portable devices such as smartphones or
tablets [6]. Those computers usually include extra hardware
(e.g., a Trusted Platform Module) to ensure the integrity
of the firmware and the operating system during the boot
process. However, in the domain of embedded systems, secure
boot is often overlooked. Therefore, common IoT devices
rarely secure the boot process and fail to assure software free
from manipulation [7]. The absence of secure boot opens the
door to attacks on mission-critical IoT systems. For instance,
recent work demonstrates attacks that alter the firmware of
interconnected industrial robots [8]. A secure boot mechanism
would have detected such modifications during the boot-up
process.
Securing the boot process in embedded devices leads to
two significant overheads. Firstly, a secure boot process adds
additional hardware and complexity. Embedded devices need
efficient and simple designs since they face several constraints
when it comes to energy consumption and memory capacity.
Secondly, verifying the integrity of the operating systems or
firmware adds a further delay to the boot process. In some
applications, longer boot time may not be affordable. For
example, micro-controllers used in the automotive industry
should be able to boot almost immediately, preferably in the
sub-second domain, so that the vehicle can be used directly
after ignition [9]. Other examples are smart home devices
where users frequently turn them on and off, like vacuum
cleaners and electric kettles. For those devices, longer boot-up
times lead to less usability for their users.
Embedded devices include a range of different micro-
controllers, which we can classify into three groups: small
scale (8–16 bit), medium scale (16–32 bit), and sophisticated
micro-controllers. This paper focuses on securing the boot
process of medium-scale microcontrollers (e.g., Raspberry Pi,
Beaglebone) equipped with an embedded operating system.
The paper makes two contributions: (1) We examine two dif-
ferent approaches to secure the boot process of an embedded
device. (2) We show the performance and runtime overhead of
the secure boot for those two approaches. Our results underline
the trade-offs between security and performance: we present
the tradeoffs ranging from 58ms to 245ms for a software-based
secure boot, which is 5.6–16% of the boot-loader execution
time, and 1.4–4% of the entire boot time (4065ms) of an off-
the-shelf Linux distribution. For the hardware-based secure
boot technique, we observe an overhead of 1900ms, which is978-1-5386-5541-2/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
Fig. 1: The boot process of the medium-scale embedded
systems consists of multiple stages. The Boot ROM and first
stage boot-loader are hard-coded by the manufacturer and are
hard to modify. The second stage and the kernel code are
modifiable and usually stored in flash memory.
72% of the boot-loader execution time, and 36% of the entire
boot time (5352ms) of an off-the-shelf Linux distribution.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First,
Section II introduces basic concepts and definitions of secure
boot. Next, Section III presents our threat model. We present
secure boot on off-the-shelf embedded hardware in Section IV
and evaluate its performance in Section V. In Section VI we
discuss the limitation of secure boot in IoT devices. Section
II presents related work and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce the required background for
both the boot process of a medium-scale embedded device
and secure boot in particular.
Boot Process. Commonly, manufacturers of embedded de-
vices divide the boot-up process [10] into several stages (see
Fig. 1). The purpose of each stage is to prepare the CPU
and transfer code fragments from external to internal memory.
Eventually, the boot-loader loads the operating system and
starts the execution of the kernel. The boot process begins
with the Boot ROM, provided by the manufacturer, which sets
and initializes the peripherals. The Boot ROM prepares the
system to execute the primary boot stage. The primary stage
configures the system and prepares the memory for loading
the secondary stage boot-loader. The secondary stage is the
actual bootloader of the operating system.
Commonly, both the Boot ROM and the primary stage are
tamper-proof, as both are hard-coded in the device firmware.
However, manufacturers allow the modification of the second
stage to provide flexibility and support for different bootload-
ers and operating systems. As a result, a secure boot process
has to ensure the integrity of the kernel and application code
before executing the secondary stage.
Security Challenge. The code in each stage can change the
overall status of the system and often the next-stage software.
As a result, we cannot trust a self-verified software, as it can
be modified to provide a false verification status. Therefore,
we need to verify in advance, and before we run each piece
of software that we give control over the system.
Secure Boot. In a secure boot process, an inherently trusted
component triggers the boot process, which is a tamper-proof
component referred to as the Roots of Trust (RoT) [11].
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [11] defines RoT as
a set of functions designed to be trusted by the operating
system. In embedded systems, RoT can be the Boot ROM (see
Fig. 1), which verifies the next-stage software and executes
only authentic software. Each stage verifies the integrity of
the next one leading to a Chain of Trust. For the verification,
we can use a dedicated monitoring hardware co-processor.
TCG has defined an international standard called the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), which defines the properties that
those modules need to fulfill.
We note that different standards and vendors use various ter-
minology to describe a secured boot process: Common terms
include, for example, Secure boot, Trusted Boot and Verified
boot. Different solutions have been defined and implemented
in specific environments including personal computers, data
centers, routers, and mobile phones [5], [12], [13]. Especially,
Secure Boot has been among the standard techniques to define
a secured process to assure the integrity of each booting
steps [14]. In table I we compare the terminology for the
existing techniques.
Related Work. Recent works demonstrate the need for
securing the boot process of connected devices from con-
sumer level printers to industrial robots [8], [15]. There is
a large body of research in the field of securing and verifying
the boot process. Khalid et al. [16] discuss the difference
between secure and trusted boot and further evaluate the
performance overhead using FPGA boards. Liu et al. give a
slightly different approach for system verification. [17] and
Lebedev et al. [18], where they are giving examples of a
remotely attested system using FPGA embedded systems. In
contrast to our work, they focus on FPGA embedded systems
while this paper focus on embedded IoT systems. From the
practitioner’s side, Google’s Chromium OS uses verified boot,
which builds a chain of trust [13]. For recent work regarding
IoT devices, Asokan et al. [19] focus on solutions regarding
the firmware update on large-scale IoT deployments. For
constraint devices, Boot-IoT [20] propose an authentication
scheme towards secure bootstrapping.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we discuss attack vectors on the boot process
of IoT systems and introduce our adversary model. A medium-
scale embedded device commonly consists of the application
itself, an embedded operating system, and the boot firmware.
The boot firmware is similar to a BIOS in commodity com-
puters and manages the initial boot process, as discussed in
Section II. From a security perspective, a secure boot process
has to ensure the integrity of each of these components, i.e.,
that none of them has been modified maliciously [22]. In the
TABLE I: Terminology comparison
Term Termination RoT Verification Additional HW
[16]
Secure
boot
Auto-
termination
Boot
ROM
By certificate
authorities
(Remote
attestation)
Not specified
[5]
Trusted
boot
Letting users
decide
Boot
ROM
Compare hash
values HSM
[13]
Verified
boot
Letting users
decide
Boot
ROM
Stored
cryptographic hash
comparison
Not specified
[21]
Mea-
sured
boot
No termination BIOS
Measures hash of
objects and logs
them
Not specified
context of connected embedded devices, i.e., IoT devices with
Internet connectivity, for example, via 5G/LTE, Bluetooth or
WiFi, this leads to two main directions of attack: (1) the
traditional attack vector of gaining physical access to the
device and (2) adversaries can manipulate the firmware via
their Internet connection. Thus, connectivity opens new attack
vectors, when compared to traditional embedded devices with-
out connectivity.
To compromise a connected IoT device, an adversary may
use security holes in both operating systems and its appli-
cations to trigger execution of remote, malicious code. Via
this code, an adversary can potentially modify data [23], the
OS [24] and also the boot process [15]. The adversary’s
goal is to make a permanent malicious modification, which is
unobservable to security analysis. Moreover, we argue that for
most IoT devices connectivity is essential for their operation,
i.e., they cannot provide their services to the users without
connectivity. Thus, just disabling Internet connectivity to close
this attack vector is not an option for the vast majority of
applications. Via physical access, the adversary can directly
manipulate and modify the application, OS, and the boot
process. The TPM is also exposed by an adversary with phys-
ical access, ongoing research by using Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUF) [25] is a promising solution. In our threat
model and further system design, we focus on the new attack
vector that Internet connectivity brings.
IV. SYSTEMS OVERVIEW
In this section, we present and discuss two system designs
to secure the boot process of an IoT device equipped with
an operating system such as embedded Linux: one design is
based solely on software mechanisms, and one additionally
utilizes hardware primitives. Both designs have specific trade-
offs regarding complexity, overhead, and system cost. Both
approaches are established [5], [13], [16] in the field, and
we do not claim their novelty. Instead, the contribution of
this paper lies (1) in comparatively evaluating the overhead
that both add to the boot process and (2) in contrasting this
overhead to the security each design provides.
A. Software-based Secure Boot with U-Boot
For the software-based method, we rely on the U-Boot [26]
bootloader to verify the integrity of the operating system.
In our system design, we make the following assumptions.
Firstly, the pre-boot environment of U-Boot has to be trusted,
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Fig. 2: From U-Boot configuration to deployment: First, we
configure the U-Boot to include the verification module. Next,
we link the object files to produce the secure version of U-
Boot. Finally, we deploy the executable file on the platform.
meaning that the security of the boot stages before U-Boot
cannot be modified. Typically, the manufacturer embeds the
first stage in the Boot ROM. Secondly, U-Boot has to be placed
in read-only memory since there is no prior verification of the
booting process. Lastly, this design requires read-only storage
of the cryptographic hashes used to verify the integrity of the
operating system.
U-Boot divides the security process into three steps: Config-
ure, Compile and Run-Time, see Figure 2. The software-based
secure boot process extends the boot process with an additional
verification step, see Figure 3. As a result, the bootloader only
boots the operating system once it has successfully verified the
integrity of the operating system. In practice, U-Boot binds the
kernel with the hardware information of the board. Thus, U-
Boot verifies that the kernel is correct and it will run on the
specific hardware configuration.
To verify the integrity of the kernel efficiently, we need
to resolve the digital block data of each image to a single
value; a conventional method is to use cryptographic hash
functions [27]. Cryptographic hash functions map an arbitrar-
ily long data to a small and fixed output, but they need to
fulfill specific properties to be considered cryptographically se-
cure [27]. U-Boot supports three cryptographic hash functions,
namely MD5, SHA-1 & SHA-256 [27]. The hash functions
have the following digest sizes: (1) MD5: 128-bit (2) SHA-1:
160-bit (3) SHA-256: 256-bit. Finally, the hash digest is being
signed by the private key, and the bootloader (U-Boot) can
verify the authenticity of the hash value by applying its public
key. Various public key algorithms could verify the hash digest
of the image. Popular public key cryptographic algorithms are
RSA [27] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [27]. U-
Boot currently supports only RSA, and the two supported key
sizes are 2048-bit and 4096-bit. The key size is the critical
factor of public key algorithms; bigger key sizes are more
difficult to break. On the other hand, the larger the key size,
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Fig. 3: Secure boot sequence with U-Boot: U-Boot runs as
the second stage, which verifies the kernel and the chosen
configuration. U-Boot passes the control of the system to the
operating system only after successful verification.
the longer the verification takes [27].
B. Hardware Security for Secure Boot
After introducing the software-only secure boot process, we
next introduce secure boot with a hardware security module.
This design further increases the security of the boot process
at the cost of adding additional hardware and boot latency.
This design is based on the TPM module as proposed by
Khalid et al. [16]. The method always starts with the initial-
ization of the TPM, which ensures that the TPM is activated.
The TPM provides the following functions defined by the
standard [28]: (1) Measurement, TPM calculates the hash of
the input data using SHA-1. (2) Extend, TPM takes the current
hash-value inside the register, appends the Measurement and
produces a new hash value (3) Control Transfer, the TPM
passes the system control to the successfully verified entity.
The process continues by calculating the cryptographic hash
value of the boot environment, which includes the system
configuration before loading the secondary stage boot loader
(see Section II). The process consists of a repetitive Measure–
Extend–Execute procedure [16]. This method is a common
way to ensure a Chain of Trust [29], which verifies the
integrity of the different stages step by step. The TPM transfers
the control of the system to each measured image only if it
has successfully verified the extended hash-value. In the case
of failure, the boot process will halt as shown in Figure 4.
For this technique, we make the following assumption: The
first entity of the Chain of Trust needs to be trusted, which
in this case is the boot ROM and first stage boot-loader. The
manufacturer should embed this code in a way so that nobody
can modify it, for example, by placing it in read-only memory.
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Fig. 4: Secure boot with a TPM co-processor: The manu-
facturer provides the boot-ROM and first stage bootloader.
We split the second stage into two phases: 1) The pre-boot
environment, where we check the integrity of U-Boot. 2) U-
Boot execution, where we check the integrity of the operating
system.
V. EVALUATION
This section evaluates both system designs in detail and
focuses on the overhead of the secure boot process in each sys-
tem. Practical application scenarios motivate this evaluation,
for example, vehicles are expected to be immediately usable
after ignition, imposing a low-latency requirement between
turning on the ignition and the full boot up of all the micro-
controllers of a vehicle. Also, home appliances like smart
vacuum cleaners and smart heaters experience frequent turn
off and on by their users, where the boot time can affect the
usability of the device.
A. Experimental Setup
We implement our system design on two generic embedded
platforms for IoT applications [30] that are readily available,
namely a Raspberry Pi and a BeagleBone (see Table II).
Finally, we extend the capabilities of the BeagleBone to
support hardware cryptographic primitives.
B. Evaluation Results
Next, we present the results of our evaluation of the
overhead of the secure boot process. We begin with the
software-based method and continue with the hardware-based
TABLE II: Hardware specifications
Model Hardware
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B ARM® Cortex A53 - 1.2GHz(quad-core)
1 GB LPDDR2 RAM
Beglebone Black C ARM® Cortex A8 - 1GHz
512MB DDR3 RAM
Cryptocape (by Cryptotronix) TPM-Module:AT97SC3204T
TABLE III: Verification overhead of TPM
Overhead Average time (ms)
TPM Initialization 993
Measurements 138
Extend PCR values 791
Total 1923
technique. The results summarize the performance of our
system design.
1) Software Mechanism of U-Boot: Figures 5a, 5b, 5c & 5d
present the overhead of verification using different key sizes
and three different hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256).
The average execution time for U-Boot without any security
mechanism is 976ms for the BeagleBone and 903ms for
Raspberry-Pi. These numbers form the baseline to compare
the overhead of secure boot. The entire boot time of the off-
the-shelf Linux-kernel (Debian GNU 7) on BeagleBone is 4s,
and for Raspberry Pi (Debian Jessie 4.4) is 7s (see Figure 6).
We begin evaluating the overhead that different hash func-
tions in U-Boot bring. In this evaluation, we set the key-size
of RSA to 2048-bit and use BeagleBone. With the MD5 hash
function, the average overhead is 58ms, representing 5.7% of
the U-Boot execution time (see Figure 5a), and 1.4% of the
entire boot time of the Linux kernel (see Figure 6a). With
the SHA-1 hash function, the average overhead increases to
117ms, which is 11% and 2.8% of the U-Boot execution
(see Figure 5a) and the entire boot time of the Linux kernel
(see Figure 6a), respectively. For SHA-256 hash function, the
overhead increases to 164 ms, 15% and 4%, respectively (see
Figure 5a & 6a).
Next, we increase the key-size of RSA to 4096-bits, us-
ing the same hash functions and BeagleBone. This key-size
increases the overhead by 24ms to 35ms depending on the
hash function (see Figure 5b). For the same experiment using
Raspberry Pi, we observe similar results (see Figures 5c &
5d).
2) TPM Hardware on BeagleBone: Table III presents the
overhead after introducing the hardware primitive (TPM). The
initialization of the TPM takes 993ms. TPM uses SHA-1
as the hash function and the overhead of calculating the
measurements (see Section II) is 138ms. For extending the
Registers (PCR) TPM takes 791ms. Overall, the whole method
takes 1923ms, which adds an overhead of 36%.
C. Discussion
Configuration choices, like the hash function, have differ-
ent performance impact and trade-offs. For example, MD5
provides better performance, but it is no longer recom-
mended [31]. FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) rec-
ommends SHA-1 and SHA-256, but Stevens et al. [32] have
found the first collisions on SHA-1.
Regarding the performance of Secure boot with TPM, we
have noticed a higher verification overhead (approximately
eight times more) compared to the software-based technique
(Verified U-Boot). The main reason for this is that there are
more measurement requirements in this method: we verify the
kernel, U-Boot and boot states which include the complete
system configurations. Another source of overhead is the
initialization time of the TPM. It is worth to notice that the
extra hardware does not intend to accelerate the cryptographic
functions, but rather to provide stronger security properties as
we explained in previous sections.
To conclude, if we compare the different parts of the boot-
time we notice that loading the kernel is the most time-
consuming part. Thus, we argue that while the overhead of
Secure Boot is not negligible, its overall performance overhead
is limited. This performance makes Secure Boot a practical
solution to secure the software-stack of medium-size devices
in the Internet of Things. For application where boot-up
needs to be reduced further, customized, modular OS kernels
with application-specific functionality could be an option to
improve the boot performance.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we evaluate the time performance of a
software- and hardware-based secure boot techniques. The
boot performance, i.e., the time until a device has booted,
is a critical aspect, for example in industrial IoT systems
like autonomous vehicles. While secure boot ensures system
integrity, it cannot protect against all attacks. In the following
we discuss key limitations:
Availability. A general limitation of secure boot is the
lack of protection against persistent DOS-attack caused by
the mechanism. An attacker can try to modify the integrity
of the operating systems repeatedly and reboot the system.
This attack will prevent the system from booting-up, and it
is possible a DOS-attack caused by the security mechanism.
We need secure boot techniques that can adapt and recognize
such an attack vector. Moreover, this attack highlights the
complexity of the security techniques in IoT which involves
heterogeneous devices. For example, a user can still expect
a compromised smart-light to work in safe mode. However,
a compromised industrial robot which involves safety-critical
aspects, it should immediately halt.
Applicability. In this paper, we focus on medium size
embedded boards (e.g., ARMv7), where resource constraints
do not prevent the extension of the boot process. In small con-
straint IoT devices (e.g., ARM Cortex M4) similar approaches
may not be applicable for several reasons. First, those devices
do not separate the boot process in stages. Moreover, we need
to implement a bootloader efficient to meet memory and run-
time constraints for those devices. Second, the firmware and
the application is stored together in flash memory, without
any protective barrier. Finally, the limited CPU power makes
it hard to make the cryptographic calculation. We can expect
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Fig. 6: Evaluation of entire boot time using the BeagleBone &
Raspberry Pi. The RSA key-size is 2048-bits, and we compare
with the three available hash functions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-
256. The RSA overhead is very small and barely visible. Note:
the graphs have discontinuing scale numbers
a different overhead compare with that of the evaluation in
section V. Hardware support like TPM is not available for
small IoT device.
Scalability. One of the benefits of the Internet of Things is
the ability to upgrade the firmware over-the-air (OTA), i.e., via
the Internet connection of the device. This flexibility provides
scalability for vendors to upload the firmware and application
updates to already deployed IoT devices. However, after each
update, the credentials matching the firmware need to be
updated. This update is challenging, as many TPM modules
do not allow direct updates of credentials to protect against
attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
The security aspects of embedded systems become more
critical with the rise of the Internet of Things. Secure boot is
one of the primary tools to secure IoT applications and their
operating system. This paper presents and evaluates trade-
offs regarding the implementation and the performance of
secure boot. Our results show that the software-based method
increases the overall boot-up time by 4%. The hardware-based
one adds an overhead of 36%.
For future works, we plan to evaluate the impact of different
system configurations and kernel configurations on the perfor-
mance of secure boot. Moreover, we will focus on the design,
implementation, and evaluation of secure boot on smaller and
more constrained devices (e.g., ARM M4).
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